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Reopening a Warn Issue:
A Two-Step Approach to Determining an
Employer's Obligation to Recognize a
Union When it Reopens a Plant
David M. Lester*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Congress passed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Noti-
fication Act, more commonly referred to as "WARN."' The primary pur-
pose of WARN is to notify employees of plant closings and mass lay-
offs.2 An issue that was not addressed by this statute is what obliga-
tions a unionized employer has when it decides to reopen a closed
plant.3 While there are many issues raised by the reopening of a plant,
this Article focuses on the employer's duty to recognize a union that
formerly represented the plant's employees before the shutdown.4
* B.S., Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University (1982); J.D., UCLA
School of Law (1985). Partner in the law firm of Musick, Peeler & Garrett. The au-
thor would like to thank Michael Goldstein for his thoughtful comments and editing,
and Sam and Sandi for all their valuable help in preparing this article.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
2. See H.R. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1045 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2078.
3. In fact, one administrative law judge noted that Congress intended "that the
provisions of WARN should be read together with the provisions of the [National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)] to give maximum effect to each of them." Geiger Ready-
Mix Co., No. 17-CA-16244, 1993 N.LR.B. LEXIS 789, *25 (1993). Therefore, it is appro-
priate to look to NLRA authority to resolve this Issue.
4. This article discusses a shutdown and reopening of the same business at the
same location; it does not concern a shutdown and reopening by a successor compa-
ny. This distinction is important because the respective scenarios demand different
standards. See Scof, Inc., No. 14-CA-20855, 1991 N.LR.B. LEXIS 937, *81-84 (1991).
The first part of this Article concentrates on how a union is recog-
nized and the duration of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).5
The Article then explores under what circumstances a CBA can bar
recognizing a new union.6 Next, the Article examines when recognizing
or failing to recognize a union violates the NLRA. After pointing out
the inherent pitfalls of recognizing and failing to recognize unions, this
Article proposes a two-step bright-line test to determine when an em-
ployer must recognize a former union after a shutdown and reopening.8
The Article concludes that whether a CBA should be given effect
depends upon the probability that the facility will reopen and the ratio-
nale for its closure. As long as the plant closed for legitimate, as op-
posed to anti-union, reasons and there was not a reasonable expecta-
tion of the plant reopening, then there would be no duty to recognize
the former union as the exclusive bargaining agent for the new and
returning employees working at the reopened plant
A. Recognition of Unions and Duration of CBAs
There are two primary methods by which a union is granted recogni-
tion.' An employer can voluntarily extend recognition to a union with-
out a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) election,'0 or if
the employer declines to grant recognition upon a demand by the un-
ion, the union may petition the Board for an election to determine by a
majority vote if the union shall represent the employees." Once a un-
ion is recognized and a CBA is signed, the CBA usually acts as a bar
against an. election petition if the CBA is for a definite term, not ex-
ceeding three years, and contains substantial terms and conditions of
employment. 2 Thus, once a CBA is executed, the recognitional status
of a union cannot be challenged by a rival union or the employer until
the.expiration of the CBA. 3
5. See infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). See also iqfra notes 35-76 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text.
9. A third procedure by which a union can become the recognized bargaining
representative for employees is if the employer commits a serious unfair labor prac-
tice that interferes with the election process and tends to preclude the holding of a
fair election. See generalUy NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). In such
circumstances, the NLRB might order the employer to recognize the union and begin
bargaining with it. Id.
10. 1 PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 523 (3d ed. 1992).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988).
12. HARDIN, supva note 10, at 396-99. Because the contract bar doctrine is Board
created, it is discretionary and not statutorily mandated. Id. at 396.
13. Employees themselves can decertify a union, but a decertification petition can
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Most CBAs include an "evergreen clause," which is an automatic
renewal provision. 4 These provisions typically provide that a CBA will
automatically renew itself unless either party gives notice that it intends
to terminate the CBA. Usually between sixty to ninety days before the
end of a CBA term, one of the parties to the contract will give such
notice that they are terminating the contract so they can negotiate a
new agreement. 5 If a plant is closed in the middle of the term of a
CBA and no provision in the closedown agreement addresses the auto-
matic renewal provision, then the CBA could continue renewing itself.
Thus, when the employer reopens its facility, it may be bound by the
old CBA. Conversely, if a plant is shutdown after the employer gives
notice to terminate or addresses the automatic renewal provision in the
closedown agreement, then there would be no contract to govern the
new work force.
Employers who decide to reopen facilities often ask if they still have
a duty to recognize their former union, or if they may reopen their plant
as a nonunion facility, or if they may proceed with a representation
election to determine who will represent the new work force. In an
attempt to address these issues, the first factor this Article examines is
the impact of the CBA in existence at the time of the shutdown. The
various obligations of an employer may differ if the plant closes during
the term of a CBA as opposed to after the expiration of a CBA. For
instance, if the CBA expires, it cannot bar the employer from recogniz-
ing a new union."
B. Whether a CBA Acts as a Contract Bar After a Plant Reopens
Depends Upon the Length of the Shutdown as Well as the
Composition of the Work Force After the Reopening
In Sheets & Mackey,"7 the CBA term ran from April 1, 1949, to April
1, 1950, with an automatic annual renewal provision "absent 60 days
notice to terminate or modify the contract."'8 In June 1949, the employ-
only be filed 12 months after the last valid election. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1988).
14. See 2 COLLECIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 36:61 (1981).
15. See id.
16. An employer could be prohibited from recognizing a new union if the new
union has not made the requisite showing of interest by a substantial number of
employees. See generalUy International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 731 (1961).
17. 92 N.LR.B. 179 (1950).
18. Id.
er ceased its operations indefinitely "for business reasons," firing its
employees. Due to the unavailability of former employees, new employ-
ees were hired when the mill resumed operations eight months later.'9
The union asserted that the CBA was automatically renewed for the
1950-51 term, and that the contract was a bar to any representation
election filed with the reopened mill.'
The employer's position was that the cessation of mill operations
effectively terminated the CBA.2' The NLRB held that since the mill
was shutdown for an indefinite period and operations were resumed
with new employees due to the previous workers' unavailability, auto-
matic renewal of the CBA would be inappropriate; consequently, there
was no contract bar."
Similarly, in Decca Records, Inc.,' the employer and the union exe-
cuted a CBA with a term from August 21, 1948, until August 20, 1950.
The CBA covered all of the company's plants.' The Richmond, Indiana
plant, which closed in June 1948, was included in the schedule of plants
covered by the CBA.' In April 1949, the parties increased the wage
rates in the contract pursuant to a reopener clause, but they did not
include the Richmond plant in the supplemental agreement.' When the
Richmond plant reopened later that month, the union and the employer
executed a separate contract for a lesser wage rate for the employees
at the Richmond plant."
In July 1949, the Richmond plant closed again.' In February 1950,
the parties amended the CBA to extend the original 1948 contract term
until August 1, 1951.' All of the employer's other plants were specifi-
cally noted, but the newly amended CBA remained silent as to the Rich-
mond plant.' In September 1950, the Richmond plant again reopened,




22. Id. at 180.
23. 93 N.L.R.B. 819 (1951).





29. Decca Records, 93 N.LR.B. at 820.
30. Id.
31. Id.
[Vol. 22: 467, 1995] Reopening a Warn Issue
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
leged that the 1948 agreement was a bar to any representation election
to be held at the Richmond plant.'
The Board held that by omitting the Richmond plant from the supple-
mental and amended CBAs, the parties manifested an intention that the
1948 contract no longer applied to the Richmond plant.n The Board
further noted:
Moreover, assuming, arguendo, that the Richmond plant was intended to be cov-
ered by the 1948 master contract and the current extension thereof, we would still
not find the instant petition to be barred thereby.
The Board has heretofore held that a contract does not bar a petition filed after
the automatic renewal date of the contract, where on such date the plant had
suspended operations, and operations were later resumed with new employees.'
Thus, it appears that if the cessation of business was for an indefinite
period and the company upon reopening hires new employees, then the
CBA would not bar holding a representation election or voluntarily rec-
ognizing another union that has manifested its majority status at the
reopened facility.
I. PREMATURE RECOGNITION AS WELL AS NONRECOGNITION OF A
UNION MAY RESULT IN A VIOLATION OF THE NLRA
When a union does not represent a majority of employees, it is improp-
er to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent. Conversely, in some
circumstances, refusing to recognize a union that is the certified bargain-
ing representative of employees violates the NLRA. The following subsec-
tions discuss the potential hazards that await an employer when it re-
opens a plant and is faced with a demand for recognition by a union,
whether it be the former union or a new union.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 821.
34. Id. See also General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165, 1167 (1958) (explaining
that "a contract does not bar an election after an indefinite period of closing" where
an employer resumes operations with new employees); Slater System Md., Inc., 134
N.L.R.B. 865, 866 (1961) (noting that an amended contract which makes it applicable
to a new location does not bar an election where the original location closed for 26
months and the company hired none of the employees from the original cafeteria at
the new location); NLRB v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 28 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir.
1994) (citing El Torito-LaFiesta Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 929 F.2d 490, 493 (9th Cir.
1991) (recognizing an exception to contract bar rule where an employer resumes
operation with new employees after an extended period of closing)).
A. Recognition of any Union After a Hiatus May Be a Violation of
Section 8(a)(2)
As discussed previously, an indefinite shutdown coupled with the hir-
ing of a new workforce nullifies a CBA. At least one Board decision held
that the mere length of a hiatus will make a CBA unenforceable.' Thus,
recognizing a union as the exclusive bargaining agent of a reopened facil-
ity could potentially violate section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which provides
that it is "an unfair labor practice... to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization."'
In Cen-Vi-Ro Pipe Corp.,' a company and a union, upon the reopen-
ing of a steel and concrete pipe manufacturing plant in 1968, after a four-
year shutdown, violated the right of employees to an uncoerced selection
of their bargaining representatives by adopting provisions of the 1964
union contract containing a union security clause.'
The company and the union argued that, although the plant shut down
for an indefinite period of time, a CBA was in effect and it renewed itself
annually.' The Board found that the CBA cannot renew itself if the em-
ployer has no employees, and any alleged CBA covering non-existent
employees or employees with no reasonable expectancy of recall, is a
nullity.
4°
The Board concluded that the employer violated section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA when it "gave unlawful assistance and support to the unions by
granting them recognition before it had a representative work force."
4
1
Thus, if a plant closes for an indefinite period of time, then it cannot
unilaterally recognize its former union, or any union, before employees
are hired at the newly reopened facility.'
35. Cen-Vi-Ro Pipe Corp., 180 N.LR.B. 344, 346-47 (1969), enforced, 457 F.2d 775
(9th Cir. 1972).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
37. 180 N.LR.B. 344 (1969), enforced, 457 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 345-46.
39. Id. at 346.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 347.
42. Cf. Hydro-Air Equip., Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 85, 86 (1985) (addressing the issue of
whether the CBA between the company and the Sheet Metal Workers' Union survived
the relocation of the company's operations). The Board held that the analysis "de-
pends on whether operations and equipment remained the same after the move and
on whether a substantial percentage of employees" transferred to the new location.
Id. at 94. The Board concluded that "the lack of any meaningful change in the
[company's] business operations upon ... relocation . . . , the transfer of at least
46[%] . . . of the workforce, and a CBA" in effect mandated the finding that the
company recognize and bargain with the Sheet Metal Workers' Union. Id. at 95-96.
Consequently, the company's extension of recognition to the Teamsters violated §§
8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA for bad faith bargaining with the Sheet Metal Workers'
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B. Failure to Recognize the Former Union After a Hiatus May Be a
Violation of Section 8(a)(5)
While in some circumstances recognizing a former union violates the
NLRA, in other circumstances, failure to recognize one also violates it.'
El Torito-La Fiesta Restaurants, Inc.' reached the latter result. In that
case, the Howard Johnson Company ran a restaurant, and it entered into
a CBA with the union for restaurant workers effective from May 16,
1981, to January 15, 1986.' Howard Johnson sold the restaurant to
Exeter who assumed the obligations under the CBA.Y On May 6, 1983,
Exeter sold the restaurant to El Torito." El Torito continued to operate
the restaurant until December 31, 1983, when it shut down the restaurant
for remodeling and laid off all of its employees.'
The remodeling took fourteen months and when the restaurant re-
opened on March 4, 1985, El Torito hired only eight of the seventy-two
laid-off employees.' On March 5, 1985, the union demanded that El
Torito "continue to recognize it as the bargaining representative.""
The NLRB concluded that the closing and reopening of the facility did
not justify the "withdrawal of recognition," and it specifically noted "the
employees had a reasonable expectation of reemployment and therefore
the temporary hiatus did not serve to break the continuity of the enter-
prise or affect the Respondent's bargaining obligation to its work
force."5' The Board further held that although El Torito hired only eight
Union, and also violated § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA for giving unlawful support and assis-
tance to the Teamsters. Id. at 97. Cf. Metropolitan Teletronics Corp., 279 N.L.R.B.
957, 970-71 (1986), eforced, 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognition of same union
in newly relocated plant as in former plant, anticipating that a majority of employees
would "opt to transfer," did not violate § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA). Although this case
concerned a relocating company, the Board could hold a company liable for a viola-
tion of § 8(a)(5) or § 8(a)(2) if it reopens the same facility, with the same employ-
ees, doing the same tasks, and not concurrently recognizing the former union as the
representative of the employees rather than some new independent union.
43. Falling to recognize the certified bargaining representatives of employees and
subsequently refusing to bargain with such representatives violates § 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
44. 295 N.L.R.B. 493 (1989), enforced, 929 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1991).





50. El Torito, 295 N.LR.B. at 493.
51. Id.
of the former employees, the mere occurrence of work force expansion
and turnover does not invalidate an existing CBA.'
The Board announced the following principle to be applied in the case
of a shutdown and resumption of operations: "In each case, a key factor
in applying the contract-bar rule or the exception was whether the
employer's shutdown of operations was indefinite. An indefinite shut-
down indicates that employees have no reasonable expectation of reem-
ployment and that the continuity of the bargaining unit no longer ex-
ists."' In El Torito, the restaurant was temporarily closed and reopened
at the same location with substantially the same business. Therefore, the
Board held that the restaurant must honor the existing CBA.'
In Morton Development Corp.,' the Board downplayed the impor-
tance of the length of the hiatus between closing and reopening relying
on a successor employer case decided by the Supreme Court.' Instead,
the Board focused upon whether there was a substantial continuity be-
tween the enterprises." In reaching this determination, the Board exam-
ined such factors as "whether the business of both employers is essen-
tially the same; whether the employees of the new company are doing
the same jobs in the same working conditions under the same supervi-
52. Id. at 493-94.
53. Id. at 494. The Board recently considered this key factor, the nature of the
shutdown of operations, in Coastal Cargo Co., 286 N.LR.B. 200 (1987). In that case,
an employer with a CBA ceased operations at two ports and terminated its em-
ployees due to lack of work. Id. at 201-02. Approximately nine months later, during
the term of the CBA, the employer began performing essentially the same type of
work for a new customer at one of the two ports. Id. The Board rejected the con-
tention that the CBA became a nullity when the company released the unit employ-
ees. Id. at 203. Emphasizing the fact that the employer continued to seek unit work
during the shutdown period, the Board found that the termination of operations was
only temporary and the employees were not discharged. Id. See also Sterling Process-
ing Corp., 291 N.L.R.B. 208, 208 (1988) (noting that the employer closed its opera-
tions due to economic hardship during the term of a CBA). Although in Sterling the
employer and the union were in substantial contact during the closedown, the em-
ployer never guaranteed the reopening of the facility. The Board found that when the
employer closed its facility indefinitely, the employees did not have a reasonable
expectation of reemployment. Id. at 210. Thus, the employer had no obligation to
bargain with the union prior to reopening the facility. Only when the employer re-
hired substantially the same work force after the hiatus did the Board determine that
the employer had a bargaining obligation. Id.
54. El Torito, 295 N.LR.B. at 496.
55. 299 N.LR.B. 649 (1990).
56. In Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 482 U.S. 27 (1987), the
Court held that the existence of a hiatus between the shutdown and reopening of an
operation is a factor, but not the only factor, in determining whether there is "sub-
stantial continuity" between the employing enterprises. Id. at 45.
57. Morton Development Corp., 299 N.L.R.B. at 650.
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sors, and whether the new entity has the same products, and... custom-
ers."6
In Morton, the respondent operated an intermediate care facility for
mentally retarded adults from 1979 until June 1985." In June 1983, the
Board certified a union as the exclusive bargaining agent for sixty-five
maintenance employees.' The union entered into a one-year CBA on
March 30, 1984, which was extended until June 30, 1985." On June 27,
1985, respondent closed the facility and bargained with the union regard-
ing the impact on employees of the closure.' After an attempted sale
failed, respondent reopened the facility as a nursing home in November,
1985.' The reopened facility employed eleven maintenance people, all of
whom had previously worked at respondent's intermediate care facili-
ty.' The Board held that the respondent violated section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA when it refused to recognize and bargain with the union because
there was a substantial continuity between the two enterprises.'
In O'Neill, Ltd.,' the Board wholly ignored a three week hiatus in
determining that a new entity had failed to recognize the union. The
Board found that the former employer had designed an elaborate scheme
to evade contractual obligations with employee bargaining representa-
tives.67 As part of this scheme, the O'Neill entities' purported to close
a plant and reopen it through "fronts" still actually controlled by the
O'Neill entities.' Because the new fronts were nothing but a facade,
management's failure to recognize the union violated section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA.7 In making this determination, "the Board applied an alter
ego analysis."7 As noted by the Board in Crawford Door Sales Co.,'
58. Id. (quoting Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 43).
59. Id. at 649.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Morton, 299 N.LR.B. at 649.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 652.
66. 288 N.LR.B. 134 (1988).
67. Id. at 1356.
68. The O'Neill entities, for purposes of this case, included Edwin R. O'Neill,
O'Neill, Ltd., Amalgamated Meat Company, and Food Equipment Leasing Company. Id.
at 1354.
69. Id. at 1356.
70. Id. at 1356 n. 16.
71. Id. at 1355 n.6.
72. 226 N.LR.B. 1144 (1976).
the focus of an alter ego analysis is whether "the two enterprises have
'substantially identical' management, business purpose[s], operation[s],
equipment, customers, and supervision, as well as ownership."'m
Hence, it appears that the Board does not utilize one definitive test to
determine when an employer must recognize a union after a closure.
Some NLRB decisions apply an "indefinite period of closure" test,' oth-
ers utilize the "substantial continuity" test,' and yet other decisions rely
on an alter ego analysis.6 Some uniformity is necessary so that the
Board can better achieve its goal of promoting industrial peace and sta-
bility. Board adoption of a single test would better align the expectations
of employers, unions, and employees.
III. THE TWO-STEP PROPOSAL
This article asserts the need for a standard to determine when an em-
ployer must recognize a union after a cessation and resumption of
business. In fashioning such a test, one must delve into the foundational
principle of such a policy. To encourage industrial peace, it behooves
both labor and management to progress forward and not become mired
in rehashing issues once a resolution has been attained. Once recognition
is resolved through an election, there should be a strong presumption
that a union represents a majority of employees. This presumption
should not be disturbed unless, due to changed circumstances, it is likely
that current employees no longer desire the union's representation.
To achieve this goal of industrial peace and stability, a more definite
test must be articulated to determine when the presumption favoring
recognition is lost. The substantial continuity test used for successor
employers is ambiguous because it involves weighing a multitude of
factors. Similarly, the alter ego' test involves balancing a variety of cri-
teria. Thus, these standards do not provide the bright-line test needed to
guide employers, unions, and employees.
In a successor employer situation, a new employer acquires the for-
mer, continuing the business in some format. In an alter ego case, there
is a change in the corporate structure while the business continues. In
both cases the court focuses on a variety of factors to determine if it is
actually the same business, and thus, should continue to recognize and
73. Id. at 1144.
74. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
77. An alter ego is merely a disguised continuance of the former employer. Typi-
cally, alter ego cases involve a technical change in the structure or identity of the
employing entity, without any substantial change in its ownership or management. See
O'Neill, Ltd., 288 NL.R.B. 1354, 1355 (1988).
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bargain with the same union. This set of issues does not necessarily arise
when the same owner reopens the same or similar business after an
indefinite shutdown.
A. Step One: Reasonable Expectation of Reopening
Therefore, the focus of a workable standard should not be on the na-
ture of the new entity formed after the closedown, but on the nature of
the dormant period. If a business is closed with no potential for reopen-
ing, then employees have no reasonable expectation of reemployment.
Thus, in a case like Decca Records, Inc.,' where there is no expectation
of reopening, the reopened employer should be free to not recognize the
former union. Conversely, as in El Torito,7 because employees knew
that the restaurant would reopen at some point in the future, albeit in-
definite, they should be permitted to retain their union's representation.
Consequently, it is the nature of the hiatus, not its length, that should de-
termine an employer's obligation. Applying this new rule to Morton'
would result in a reversal of the Board because the parties harbored no
expectation of the facility's reopening.
There are a variety of considerations a trier of fact can examine to
determine the existence of a reasonable expectation of reopening. Prefer-
ential rehire lists, updates to employees, and continued communications
with the union are indicia of such an expectation.8' An employer's state-
ment that the business will resume at some indefinite point in the future.
after a remodeling or reorganization also indicates that the business will
reopen. Alternatively, closing due to economic conditions with no pros-
pect of being able to continue should signal to employees that the busi-
ness will not reopen.
Moreover, employer action during the hiatus directly bears on the
reasonable expectation of reopening.2 An attempt to sell the business or
78. 93 N.LR.B. 819 (1951).
79. 295 N.LR.B. 493 (1989), enforced, 929 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1991).
80. 299 N.LR.B. 649 (1990).
81. In 1989, the Sheraton Palace Hotel in San Francisco closed for remodeling.
After bargaining with eight separate unions, the Hotel offered its 425 employees the
choice of a severance package or recall rights once the hotel reopened. The Hotel
sent employees a monthly newsletter during the renovation to keep them informed of
any progress. See generally Laabs, Sheraton Remodels a Hotel and a Service Plan,
PERSONNEL J. 86 (Aug. 1991). Therefore, even if there is a two year hiatus like there
was for the Sheraton employees, the other indicia create a reasonable expectation of
reopening.
82. The actions of a union during a hiatus may also affect the reasonable expecta-
its assets by the employer, is also a clear sign that the closure is not tem-
porary." In Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp.,' the Board noted
that the length of a hiatus alone is not determinate in assessing employer
obligations.' In Rockwood, the plant lay dormant for approximately five
years.' Despite this significant lapse, the Board held that the employer's
bargaining obligation was intact.8 7 The court evaluated the following fac-
tors: plant equipment was preserved for production, "one unit employee
worked throughout the hiatus,... other employees were on layoff status
thus having some expectation of recall,.., and the Union communicated
with the employees and with management" during the hiatus." All of
these predict a future resumption of business.'
Thus, any shutdown which engenders a reasonable expectation of
reopening will not release an employer from its collective bargaining
obligations. While companies experiencing temporary shutdowns might
still be bound by a CBA, indefinite closings creating no expectation of
reemployment should strip the CBAs of effect even if a CBA had been
automatically renewed. In these circumstances, the better method for
tion of reopening. In Nephi Rubber Product Corp., 303 N.LR.B. 151 (1991), enforced,
976 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1992), the Board applied a successor employer analysis to a
company that had closed due to economic conditions and emerged 16 months later
as a new company after a bankruptcy. Id. at 152. The Board downplayed the 16
month hiatus citing, among other things, the continued union efforts to reopen the
plant, the union's regular meetings with employees, the continued union newsletters,
and the union's pursuit of pension obligations on behalf of the employees. Id. at 152
n.11.
83. See Molded Fiber Glass Body Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 400 (1970) (finding that closure
was intended to be permanent based on the employer's attempt to sell the closed
plant).
84. 299 N.LR.B. 1136 (1990), enforced, 942 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1991).
85. Id. at 1138, 1139 n.11.
86. Id. at 1136-38.
87. Id. at 1139 n.11.
88. Id.
89. See also Scof, Inc., No. 14-CA-20855, 1991 N.LR.B. LEXIS 937 (1991), wherein
the Administrative Law Judge held:
The lack of permanency of the closing is demonstrated by the fact that at no
time after the April "permanent" closing did Respondent seek to lease the
factory to a third party nor did it attempt to transfer the machinery else-
where or to sell off any of the woodworking or other machinery in the
plant. Rather, it took the opposite course: it obliged its maintenance employ-
ee, William Taylor, to keep the plant in constant readiness for resuming pro-
duction. It paid this maintenance man $17 per hour to oil the machinery, run
the machinery from time-to-time to have it capable of operation, and to oIl
the cutting tables to prevent rusting. This is further evidence that the shut
down of April 18 was not a bona fide permanent closing of the plant.
Id. at *95.
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establishing the support of labor is for the union to file a petition for an
election after the plant reopens.'
B. Step Two: Legitimate Rationale for Closure
If a company closes a plant to avoid its obligations under a CBA, then
it may have unlawfully refused to bargain and discrininatorily failed to
reemploy bargaining unit employees." As the Supreme Court noted in
Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,'
an employer may shutdown its entire business even if motivated by the
most egregious anti-unionism; however, the employer cannot close its
business temporarily and then reopen in order to oust the union.' By
simply focusing on the reasonable expectation of reopening, an employer
can circumvent a CBA by closing down with no intention of reopening
and then six months later reopen the business and hire new employees.
Because the old workforce would have no reasonable expectation that
the plant would reopen, the employer would not be bound to recognize
the union. To ensure this result does not occur, a second prong must be
added onto the proposed new standard.
In Pecrete, Inc.,9' the Board found no discriminatory intent in closing
a plant and reopening it six days later without union employees.' The
Board found the terminations were based on a legitimate lack of work."
The Board further concluded that "economic reasons and not any unlaw-
ful motive to encourage or discourage union membership" motivated the
failure to rehire union employees.' The Board based its analysis on
whether the employer shutdown the facility in good faith.' Thus, if a
90. See Monfort, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 965 F.2d 1538 (10th Cir. 1992) (election held to
determine representation status).
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), .158(a)(5) (1988).
92. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
93. Id. at 271-74.
94. 132 N.L.R.B. 986 (1961).
95. Id. at 992.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 993. The NLRB adopted the Administrative Law Judge's finding:
I have found ... that the Respondent was not motivated by discriminatory
motives in discharging them and not recalling them in that the Respondent
thereby practiced no discrimination to encourage or discourage membership
in a union and accordingly did not violate Section 8(a)(3). Similarly here in
discharging them and not recalling them thereafter, the Respondent's reason
was entirely economic and Respondent's motive was not to undermine Local
company closes a plant in good faith, regardless of the amount of time
the facility lies dormant, the company would not violate section 8(a)(5)
based on changed circumstances, even if it chose to later reopen the
facility without recognizing the union.' Consequently, when examining
the propriety of a shutdown, the key element in determining the occur-
rence of an 8(a)(5) violation is the motivation for a closedown.
Even if a closedown is for legitimate reasons, the reopening of a facili-
ty may incur liability. In Cumberland Shoe Corp.," the Chapel Hill
plant was fully closed on April 1, 1964."'1 The Board found the Chapel
Hill plant discontinued operations for compelling economic reasons, and
not as "an attempt to revive [it] as a nonunion plant."" Hence, the
Board concluded that the closedown of the plant was not a sham, and
that the closedown did not violate sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA.
Approximately six months later, Cumberland Shoe Corp. reopened the
plant without notifying the union." The Board held that "the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by its failure to notify the Union of the
reopening and its refusal to bargain with the Union upon request."1°
46's majority or to avoid bargaining with Local 46 as the exclusive represen-
tative of its metal lather employees. I therefore conclude and find that the
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) as alleged in the complaint.
Id.
99. See Molded Fiber Glass Body Co., 182 N.LR.B. 400, 401 (1970) (finding no
violation of §§ 8(a)(5) and (1) by reopening and refusing to bargain with the union
because of respondent's "lack of union animus, the good faith efforts made by the
parties to reach some type of agreement even after the plant was apparently perma-
nently closed, and the economic considerations which admittedly were the sole fac-
tors which caused the plant's closing and subsequent reopening"). But see Swift
Indep. Corp., 289 N.LR.B. 423, 430 (1988), enforcement denied, 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that closures violated the NLRA because closures of two plants "were
not genuine closures, but were merely maneuvers designed to achieve indirectly what
the [employer] could not directly obtain from the Union" in concessions and because
"the 'closures' were effectuated with the preconceived intent to reopen the plants
shortly thereafter"); Schmutz Foundry and Machine Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1496, 1501
(1980), enforced, 678 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that respondent's withdrawal
of recognition after a hiatus was a violation of §§ 8(a)(5) and (1) because the
-'closing' of the foundry and its subsequent reactivation were part of a coordinated
plan to be free of the Union"); Circle T Corp., 238 N.LR.B. 245, 249-50 (1978), en-
forced, 614 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the company violated sections
8(a)(5) and (1) by closing and reopening a business where such actions "were de-
signed and implemented as a 'maneuver' to eliminate the Union as the bargaining
representative" because "[s]uch a motive is inconsistent with the principles of collec-
tive bargaining").
100. 156 N.L.R.B. 1130 (1966).
101. Id. at 1132.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1132-33.
104. Id. at 1134.
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The Board based its decision on the trial examiner's finding that the
respondent refused to bargain even though it did not have a bona fide
doubt about the Union's majority status.'" Thus, under present Board
precedent, if a company does not hire new employees when it reopens
and it refuses to bargain with its old union regarding the reopening, the
company risks an 8(a)(5) violation."°
This analysis is also supported by HLH Products."7 In that case, the
respondent closed its plant, but then resumed operations six months
later." The Board held that the reopening of the plant without bargain-
ing with the union was unlawful." In a footnote, the trial examiner ad-
monished the respondent: "I have found that the plant was shut down
temporarily on February 4, 1965, as an antiunion stratagem. The workers
in the certified bargaining unit therefore retained their status as employ-
ees of Respondent. I would reach the same result even if the shutdown
was intended to be permanent... ."0 Consequently, even if the shut-
down was indefinite.rather than temporary, a company can be held liable
for violation of section 8(a)(5) if the closedown was a sham.'
In Sterling Processing Corp., 2 the employer closed its facility due to
economic conditions."' Nineteen months later the employer reopened
the plant and rehired a significant number of the former employees.""
105. Id.
106. It is also interesting to note from this case that the employer is not only liable
for violations regarding the reopening of the facility, but if the reopening of the facil-
ity leads to the conclusion that the closedown was a sham,. then the employer may
additionally be responsible for the violations concerning the closedown. Id.
107. 164 N.LR.B. 325 (1967), enforced, 396 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
982 (1968).
108. See id.
109. Id. at 329. The NLRB specifically held:
In these circumstances, and as the closing of the plant approximately 6
months after the Union won a Board election was preceded by antiunion
threats predicting such action and was followed upon reopening by a hiring
procedure which ignored the Union's bargaining rights and eliminated a ma-
jority of employees who voted in the election, I find, as alleged by the Gen-
eral Counsel, that Respondent "feigned" a permanent closing of the plant on
February 4, 1965, as a device to get rid of the Union and its supporters.
Id. at 328.
110. Id. at 329 n.16.
111. See id.
112. 291 N.LR.B. 208 (1988).
113. Id.
114. Id.
The Board found that upon "reopening, the Respondent had the same
ownership, corporate form, plant location, and telephone number.""'
Likewise, the "labor-intensive segment of the... facility [was] basically
unaltered.""6
The Board held that the company did not have "an obligation to bar-
gain with the Union before it modified the preexisting wages and work-
ing conditions prior to reopening its facility."' 7 The Board also stated
that "[tihe Respondent's ultimate hiring of a majority of its prehiatus
work force is not relevant in determining whether the employer is ob-
ligated to bargain with Unions concerning terms and conditions set prior
to the hiring of that work force.""8
Upon resuming production under the same ownership, corporate form,
and management, in the same location utilizing the same process, an
employer is obligated to recognize and bargain with the union.' The
Board concluded: "[Wihere the employing entity remains the same after
the hiatus as it was before, we find that the hiatus, standing alone, does
not relieve the Respondent from its bargaining obligations. " "
The Board in Sterling further noted that the successorship doctrine is
not applicable to the facts to create a bargaining obligation because "no
logical or legal basis exists for treating the Respondent as a new employ-
er when it reopened." 2' Thus, based on this case, a company runs a sig-
nificant risk that it will be required to bargain with its old union if it
reopens its plant in the same location, owned by the same people, ex-
115. Id. at 209.
116. Id.
117. Sterling, 291 N.LR.B. at 209.
118. Id. at 210.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 210 n.10. See also Coastal Cargo Co., 286 N.LR.B. 200, 203 (1987) (hold-
ing that the Respondent was a continuation of the employer that signed the CBA be-
cause it had "substantially Identical form without significant alteration of Its supervi-
sion, management, ownership, location, organization, or business purpose"). The Board
concluded that the case was not "one of initial recognition of a union by a newly
formed employer." Id. Instead, the Board found the same employer ceased and also
resumed operations. Id. The Board imposed bargaining obligations on the resumed
operations not because it was an alter ego or a successor, but because the shutdown
had been temporary rather than indefinite. Id. at 203-04. Cf. Scott Manufacturing Co.,
133 N.LR.B. 1012, 1013-16 (1961), enforced 302 F.2d 280 (Ist Cir. 1962) (holding that
a parent corporation, its subsidiary which closed its doors and fired its personnel,
and a third company allegedly leasing space and operating in subsidiary's plant all
constituted a single employer or joint enterprise accountable for unfair labor practices
stemming from the temporary shutdown of the subsidiary's plant and discharging
employees and the reopening the subsidiary as the third company in order to avoid
dealing with the union and to evade contract benefits obtained by the union for the
subsidiary's employees).
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isting in the same corporate form, with the same management, in the
same business, and using the same production methods."n
The re sult in Sterling is nonsensical. The Board concluded that the
employer has no duty to bargain about wage rates and working condi-
tions before reopening, but that it does have an obligation to recognize
the former union after the company rehires a number of former employ-
ees."n A better result would be to examine whether the employees had
any reasonable expectation of the company reopening at the time of
closing. If not, this fact in conjunction with the legitimate reason for the
employer's closedown would create no obligation for the employer to
recognize or bargain with the union. 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of the various standards applied to employers in determining
when they need to recognize and bargain with a union after reopening
following a closedown, this article presents an overview of the various
methods and recommends a two-step analysis. The first prong of the test
is whether there is a reasonable expectation of reopening at the time of
the closedown. If there is a reasonable expectation, then an employer
must recognize and bargain with its former union. If there is not a rea-
sonable expectation of reopening, then one must examine if the
closedown was for a legitimate reason. If there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of reopening and the closedown was not a sham, then the employer
has no duty to recognize the former union even if the employer hires
substantially the same work-force performing substantially similar jobs.
Application of this two-step standard better achieves industrial peace
and stability than using a multi-factored balancing test similar to the one
used in successor employer and alter ego cases. Because an employer
can violate the NLRA by either recognizing a former union or by failing
122. Sterling, 291 N.LR.B. at 210-11.
123. Id. at 209-11.
124. Although the case was decided on statute of limitations grounds, the Regional
Office of the NLRB in John Morrell & Co., 304 N.LR.B. 896 (1991), enforced, 998
F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1993) utilized a similar standard when recommending that a complaint
issue for violation of § 8(a)(5). The Regional Office noted that the plant closing was
temporary because of the employer's "unsuccessful attempts to negotiate lower labor
costs" before the closure, and the employer's "intent to reopen the plant" if it could
without being bound by the CBA. Id. at 900. Although this standard articulated only
a temporary closure prong, it also took into account whether the closure was a
sham. Id,
to recognize a former union, a clearer standard is necessary. The pro-
posed test ensures that an employer cannot circumvent its obligations by
a sham closure. Likewise, the employer is not saddled with a union obli-
gation after a legitimate closure with no reasonable expectation of re-
opening, which is followed by an actual reopening due to changed cir-
cumstances.
